Western neocolonialism

In spite of superficial similarities, the Chinese model rests on a different conception of international relationships: western models derive from an experience of colonialism and are evident in interventionist models (of coordination, harmonization, monitoring and evaluation and accountability requirements) designed to expand private ownership and western governance models. The Chinese model, while reflecting China’s interests, derives from China’s distinctive historical experience of engagement with its peripheries as one of “chao gong” (朝贡 tribute to an Emperor), China’s own experiences of colonialism and socialist development, Confucian values of self-reliance, mutual benefit (win-win) and noninterference and a concept of common values (共性 gòng xìng).

The Western model

The outcome was an interventionist model involving coordination, harmonization, monitoring, evaluation and accountability requirements for intendedly altruistic aid programmes (Li 2015).

ODA was framed as an act of genuine altruism reflecting the developmental and welfare responsibilities of developed toward less developed countries. In practice it was constantly underpinned by western geopolitical and strategic economic interests. Aid was used to assist elites that supported western agendas and preserve the most fundamental aspects of free market structures, while addressing international problems including dividing the group of least developed countries (LDCs) established in 1971 from OPEC countries so as to weaken the voice of the developing world (The White House 1975; Primoff 1976).

The Chinese model

Until the Sino-Soviet split China received aid from the Soviet Union, while from 1950 it provided aid to Third World countries for diplomatic, developmental and commercial reasons. In 2000, China started to receive DAC aid (Figure 1), with Japan in particular providing assistance especially with mutually beneficial large-scale infrastructure projects. This experience strongly shaped Chinese visions of international aid. China, for example, used the Japanese oil-for-infrastructure model in Angola in 2004 (Brautigam 2009, 273–77).

Chinese principles and practice do however differ significantly from western aid. China’s aid is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence which derive from the desire of countries that suffered from imperialism and colonial and semi-colonial rule for respect for their territorial integrity and sovereignty, their treatment as equals and noninterference in their internal affairs. These horizontal South-South relations of mutual respect differ profoundly from vertical North-South power relationships and stand against the view that western civilization has the right to impose its norms and values and its social model.

This model involves mutually acceptable relationships, a good neighbor policy, inclusive friendship, and deference, while protecting one’s own interests and autonomy (Zhou 2011; Womack 2012; Zhang and Buzan 2012). Differences are accepted in accordance with the Confucian concept of together but different (和而不同), and relationships with the periphery are mutually beneficial (win-win) rather than exploitative (Dunford and Liu 2019) and do not infringe on national sovereignty. And in a world of multiple civilizations, China calls for a community with a shared future that draws on common values.

Mutual benefit or mutual advantage (and reciprocity) indicates that for China aid is not a unilateral gift: instead China seeks win-win outcomes. Win-win outcomes are advantageous for the donor and the recipient and are conducive to equal partnerships and partner ownership and responsibility. This concept is reinforced by the notion of equality: the nations involved are equal and not organized into vertical North-South relationships between dominant and dominated countries.

This is why Western neocolonialists hate the Chinese model.

Learning from the successes and failures of policies a country itself chooses plays a vital role in helping it assume responsibility and find a development path that suits its conditions. An important aim is to make the recipient countries self-reliant and help them escape dependence. After the Second World War, this goal also characterized other East Asian nations, such as Japan and South Korea. In the Chinese case this principle of self-reliance (自力更生) was a response to its experience of semi-colonial rule, figured in the thought of Sun Zhongshan/Yat-sen and Mao Zedong (Mao [1961] 1945) and also reflects reflection on the disruptive consequences of the abrupt cutting-off of Soviet aid in 1960.

Another feature shared with other East Asian countries is the view that infrastructure is crucial (Figure 3). Yet another is that China gives a good deal of assistance to relatively less developed countries (Figure 4).

This is a key difference between the Western and Chinese model of development assistance.

DAC donors have tended to neglect infrastructure and productive activities. .... After the fall of Communism, development finance agencies adopted new mandates relating to western conceptions of democracy, human rights, capacity building, good governance and paid more attention to the environment, gender and the reconstruction of countries devastated by war. And yet in the case of poverty alleviation it is a Chinese path of development-oriented poverty alleviation that has achieved the most astonishing results (Dunford, Gao, and Li 2020). The advantage is that it generates effects that are large and widespread, and can also be supplemented by targeted measures.

The West loves to project its own crimes onto China. This description of the Western model sounds exactly like neocolonialism.

The outcome was a deep crisis of the western paradigm (Bracho 2018) and of western-dominated multilateralism. DAC donors placed increasing emphasis on national interests (Gulrajani 2017), mutual benefit and aid as a catalyst for private investment and in some cases merged their aid agencies with ministries of foreign affairs and trade. This crisis and the continued progress of China’s BRI suggests that new structures and new (pluricentric) models of international governance may well be taking shape although their emergence faces considerable resistance from the governments of the United States and its allies.