U.S. biggest sponsor of terrorism and war xinjiang uyghurs cold war
Excerpt from the book Operation Gladio: The Unholy Alliance between the
Vatican, the CIA, and the Mafia by Paul L. Williams :
"Throughout the 1990s, hundreds of Uyghurs were transported to
Afghanistan by the CIA for training in guerrilla warfare by the
mujahideen. When they returned to Xinjiang, they formed the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement and came under Çatlı's expert direction.
Graham Fuller, CIA superspy, offered this explanation for radicalizing
the Chinese Muslims: The policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of
helping them [Muslims] against our adversaries worked marvelously well
in Afghanistan against the Red Army. The same doctrines can still be
used to destabilize what remains of Russian power, and especially to
counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia. This policy of
destabilization was devised by Bernard Lewis, an Oxford University
specialist on Islamic studies, who called for the creation of an “Arc of
Crisis” around the southern borders of the Soviet Union by empowering
Muslim radicals to rebel against their Communist overlords."
trade bullying u.s. patents japan
If
history is a mirror to the future, the similarities between the
spiralling technology stand-off between China and the US and the
economic wars waged by the US with Japan – which peaked in the 1980s and
1990s – may be instructive. But there are differences between the two
which may predict a different outcome.
The
US-Japan economic tensions started in the 1950s over textiles, extended
to synthetic fibres and steel in the 1960s, and escalated – from the
1970s to 1990s – to colour televisions, cars and semiconductors, as
Japan’s adjusted industrial policy and technology development moved it
up the industrial chain.
Boosted
by government support, Japan’s semiconductor industry surpassed the US
as the world’s largest chip supplier in the early 1980s, causing
wariness and discontent in the US over national security risks and its
loss of competitiveness in core technologies.
The
Reagan administration regarded Japan as the biggest economic threat to
the US. Washington accused Tokyo of state-sponsored industrial policies,
intellectual property theft from US companies, and of dumping products
on the American market.
The
US punished Japanese companies for allegedly stealing US technology and
illegally selling military sensitive products to the Soviet Union. It
also forced Japan to sign deals to share its semiconductor technologies
and increase its purchases of US semiconductor products.
“The
Trump administration is using similar tactics against China that were
used against Japan in the 1980s and 1990s,” said an adviser to the
Chinese government, on condition of anonymity, adding that the US was
continuing its hegemony to curtail China’s tech development and was
trying to mobilise its allies to follow suit.
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After
talks to end the US-China trade faltered last month, Huawei – a global
leader in the 5G market – is now standing at centre stage of a
protracted technology stand-off between Beijing and Washington, which
has grown increasingly wary of the rising competitiveness of Chinese
tech companies.
Zhang
Monan, a researcher with the Beijing-based China Centre for
International Economic Exchanges, does not foresee an easing of the
rivalry between the US and China.
“The current US-China conflicts are more complicated than those between the US and Japan,” she said.
“The
US will only get more intense in its containment of China and the tech
rivalry won’t ease, even if China and the US could reach a deal to
de-escalate the trade tensions.”
Back
in 1982, the US justice department charged senior officials at Hitachi
with conspiracy to steal confidential computer information from IBM and
take it back to Japan. IBM also sued Hitachi. The two companies settled
the case out of court and Hitachi paid 10 billion yen (US$92.3 million)
to IBM in royalties in 1983, while accepting IBM inspections of its new
software products for the next five years.
Toshiba,
a major electronics producer in Japan, and Norway’s Kongsberg
Vaapenfabrikk secretly sold sophisticated milling machines to the Soviet
Union from 1982 to 1984, helping to make its submarines quieter and
harder to detect. This transfer of sensitive military technology in the
middle of an arms race between the US and the Soviet Union was not
revealed until 1986.
The
US issued a three-year ban on Toshiba products in 1987 and the company
ran full-page advertisements in more than 90 American newspapers
apologising for its actions.
In
1985, the US imposed 100 per cent tariffs on Japanese semiconductors. A
year later, in its five-year semiconductor deal with the US, Japan
agreed to monitor its export prices, increase imports from the US, and
submit to inspections by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
This
was followed by a second five-year semiconductor deal in 1991, in which
Japan agreed to double the US market share in Japan to 20 per cent. In
yet another bilateral semiconductor deal in 1989 Japan was required to
open its semiconductor patents to the US.
Meanwhile,
the US government boosted its efforts to help American businesses
cement their industrial leverage in the chip sector and unveiled rules
to protect its domestic chip industry.
The
two countries were irreconcilable in 1996 on how to measure their
respective market share. Overall market circumstances had also changed
by then, with the US becoming competitive in microprocessing, and South
Korea and Taiwan emerging as strong rivals to Japan.
Its dominance in semiconductors lost, Japan reached out to Europe for a range of cooperative technology deals.
“History
can tell that high technology matters greatly to national security
strategies. It is not a process of mere market competition. It follows
the law of the jungle,” Zhang said.
The
US has intensified its investment scrutiny by rolling out the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act last year, which extends the
regulation to key industrial technology sectors.
Zhang
predicted the US would continue to contain China’s technological
development in key sectors such as AI, aerospace, robots and
nanotechnology – all of which are of great importance to Beijing.
The
US has said Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE present a national
security risk. Last April it cut US supplies to ZTE, citing violations
of sanctions against Iran and North Korea. The ban was removed three
months later after ZTE paid US$1.4 billion in fines.
It
was a wake-up call for China to develop its own core technologies. The
subsequent US ban on Huawei added to the urgency to do so, observers
said.
Wang
Yiwei, a professor in international relations with Renmin University,
said China had to develop its own hi-tech know-how while continuing the
opening up process.
“China has paid a price to learn whose globalisation it is,” he said.
“We
may see some extent of disengagement with the US in technology and
dual-use sectors, but China can speed up cooperation with European
countries, and other countries such as Israel, to offset the risks from
the US.”
In
December, the US filed criminal charges against Huawei and its chief
financial officer Sabrina Meng Wanzhou, alleging bank fraud, obstruction
of justice and technology theft.
The
squeeze continued last month with the US blacklisting Huawei,
restricting its access to American hi-tech supplies and putting pressure
on its allies to freeze the company out of the 5G market. So far, those
allies, including Germany and Japan, have remained hesitant about
meeting the US request and refrained from siding with either country.
Chinese
foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on Monday that Huawei had
obtained 46 commercial contracts in 30 countries as of June 6,
“including some US allies and some European countries that the US has
been working hard to persuade out of the contracts”.
For
Zhang, the differences between Japan’s experience of US concerns of
technological advancement and China’s may offer some hope for Chinese
ambitions.
“Dependent
on US for security protection, Japan was limited in [its ability to]
push back and was already a developed country,” she said.
“But
China has huge domestic market potential to address the imbalance
[between] economic and technology development. This remains a big
attraction to multinational companies, which would enable China to
integrate into global innovation and technology cooperation, but China
has to figure out how to dispel the doubts on its growth model.”
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